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Abstract
Alerting experience with a well-acknowledged safety analysis code
initiated the authors to pay attention to safety issues of complex sys-
tems. Their first concern was the statistical characteristics of such a
code. We point out a remarkable weakness of the so called 0.95/0.95
methodology: when repeating the search for the tolerance limit, we
get a higher value with non-negligible probability. We propose the
sign test as an alternative method. We point out the correct form of
Wilks’ formula when the number of parameters subjected to limitation
is two or more.
Keywords: safety analysis, 0.95|0.95 methodology, sign test
1 Introduction
Alerting experience with a well-acknowledged safety analysis code [1], [2]
which is widely used in the licensing process of nuclear power plants, initiated
the authors to pay attention to safety issues of nuclear reactors. Their first
concern was the statistical characteristics of such a code. In order to judge if
a given nuclear reactor was safe, one had to demonstrate that safety criteria
are met with a reasonable probability. But to judge the output of the code,
one needed to know the probability distribution of the output.
In a former paper [3] we discussed the handling of statistics of model
calculations with several outputs. The present work provides a correct sta-
tistical estimation of a quantile and we point out the inadequacy of the
1
traditional 95% probability limit approach, which seems to be the practice
at US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We advocate the sign test instead.
Let us consider results of N runs of a code modelling the single output
variable, which is subjected to limitation. Let the output values be ordered:
y(1) < y(2) < · · · < y(N). (1)
We call the ensemble (1) a sample. Let the acceptance range be given as
(−∞, UT ], where UT is the technological limit for y. We assume that the
distribution of y is unknown, and are looking for a quantile Qγ such that∫ Qγ
−∞
dG(y) = γ, (2)
where G(y) is the unknown cumulative distribution function of output vari-
able y. Quantile Qγ is to be derived from measured value, thus, itself is a
random variable.
In Section 2, we address the problem of estimating quantile Qγ . Two
solutions are mentioned: the classical Baysian solution and a recent solution,
which is applicable to several variables. In Section 3, we present an example
where the 0.95—0.95 methodology seems to fail and in Section 4, we sug-
gest another methodology based on sign test. Our concluding remarks are
summarized in the last Section.
2 Estimation for one-tailed quantile
The random interval (−∞, y(s)] covers a proportion larger than γ of the
unknown distribution function G(y) with probability β when
β = P{y(s) > Qγ}, (3)
where P{A} denotes the probability of event A. It can be shown [4] that
β =
s−1∑
j=0
(
N
j
)
γj (1− γ)N−j. (4)
When s = N , i.e. the largest element of the sample is chosen as upper limit
of the random interval, one obtains the well-known formula:
β = 1− γN . (5)
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Since one finds misinterpretations in the engineering practice it is not super-
fluous to underline the proven notion of formula (5). β is the probability that
the largest value y(N) of a sample comprising N observations is greater then
the γ quantile of the unknown distribution of output variable y. Another
formulation asserts that β is the probability that the interval (−∞, y(N)]
covers a larger than γ portion of the unknown distribution G(y) of the out-
put variable y.
2.1 Old Bayesian method
If we carry outN runs, i.e., we determine the output variable fromN fluctuat-
ing inputs, and define a fix acceptance region Ha = [LT , UT ]. The probability
P{y ∈ Ha} =
∫
Ha
g(u) du = w
Table 1: Number of failures observations N − k at which w ≥ ω holds with probability
at least α
α ω N − k = 0 N − k = 1 N − k = 2
0.90 21 31 51
0.90 0.95 44 75 104
0.99 228 387 530
0.90 27 45 60
0.95 0.95 57 92 123
0.99 297 472 626
0.90 43 63 80
0.99 0.95 89 129 164
0.99 457 660 836
of the output variable y to lay in Ha is unknown. However, knowing that
k elements out of N are in the acceptance interval, we can estimate the
probability that the unknown acceptance probability w is greater than a
prescribed ω without knowing the distribution function g(u). The claim is
based on Bayes theorem on conditional probabilities and asserts
β(ω|N, k) =
k∑
j=0
(
N + 1
j
)
(1− ω)j ωN+1−j. (6)
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The proof is available in textbooks. Using (6), we can easily determine the
allowed number of rejections in a sample of N elements to make sure that
w ≥ ω is true with a given β ≥ α prescribed probability. In Tab. 1, we have
collected a few examples to give an impression how expression (6) works. It
is noteworthy that even if k = 0, i.e. when all outputs are accepted, there
is a non-zero probability that outputs will appear which should have been
rejected. As we see, no failure out of 21 runs assures the same probability as
one failure out of 31 runs or two failures out of 51 runs (cf. the first row of
Tab. 1).
2.2 Case of Several Variables
The following statement generalizes the estimate of a quantile to several
output variables. In the case of n ≥ 2 output variables with continuous
joint distribution function G(y1, . . . , yn) it is possible to construct n-pairs
of random intervals [Lj , Uj], j = 1, . . . , n such that the probability of the
inequality ∫ U1
L1
· · ·
∫ Un
Ln
g(y1, . . . , yn) dy1 · · · dyn > γ (7)
is free of g(y1, . . . , yn) and is given by
P
{∫ U1
L1
· · ·
∫ Un
Ln
g(y1, . . . , yn) dy1 · · · dyn > γ
}
= β,
were 0 < β ≤ 1 is a given number. Details and proof of the statement can
be found in [4].
3 Challenge of the 0.95|0.95 methodology
In the present section, we consider an example. We assume the single output
variable y to have a lognormal distribution with parameters m and d. This
will be our ”unknown” G(y) distribution. The density function is
g(y) =
1
yd
√
2π
exp
[
−1
2
(
log y −m
d
)2]
, (8)
where y ≥ 0.
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We use Monte Carlo simulation to generate four samples of size N = 100,
in the simulation we take m = 2.5 and d = 0.5. The goal is to get point
estimates of 0.95-quantiles for each sample and to determine the shortest two-
tailed confidence intervals which cover with 0.95 probability the ”unknown”
quantile Q0.95, the reference value is Q0.95 ≈ 27.73. The four samples are
labeled as A, B, C, and D, the results of the simulation are summarized in
Tab. 2.
Table 2: Confidence intervals [y(r), y(s)] covering the quantile Q0.95.
A B C D
y(r) 22.66 25.21 22.48 23.29
Q0.95 27.73 27.73 27.73 27.73
y(s) 33.25 38.28 35.88 53.05
(r, s) (91, 100) (91, 100) (91, 100) (91, 100)
If the upper limit, determined by the technology would be UT=40, then,
cases A,B, and C could be considered only as safe.
Setting β = 0.95 and γ = 0.95, from Eq. (5) we get the sample size N =
58, i.e. the largest element of a sample having 58 elements 1 should be chosen
as Q0.95. We performed the following numerical experiment: Generated a
sample of 58 elements, that sample is called basic sample, in notation: y(b).
Then, we repeat the sample generation n = 1000 times, thus obtaining the
samples y(1), y(2), . . . , y(1000). The largest elements of those samples can be
seen in Fig. 1. The minimum of the values is 22.62, the largest value is
132.27. One can observe that in 224 samples (more than 22% of the one
thousand samples) the maximum exceeds the maximum of the basic sample
(y(b)(58) = 45). Let us check whether that number is reliable or not.
The probability that the largest element in a given sample is greater than
Qγ is 1−γN . Let ξn(Qγ) stand for the random variable giving the number of
maximum elements exceeding Qγ . The probability distribution of the newly
introduced random variable is
P{ξn(Qγ) = k} =
(
n
k
)
(1− γN)k γN(n−k). (9)
1In the practice N = 59 is used.
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Figure 1: Results of of 1000 samples of size N = 58. The largest element of the basic
sample is y(b)(58) ≈ 45.
From this expression we obtain the expectation value and the variance as
E{ξn(Qγ)} = n(1− γN), (10)
D2{ξn(Qγ)} = n γN (1− γN). (11)
When n and k are sufficiently large, the distribution of the random variable
χn(Qγ) =
ξn(Qγ)−E{ξn(Qγ)}
D{ξn(Qγ)} (12)
is approximately standard normal, hence,
E{ξn(Qγ)} − λ D{ξn(Qγ)} ≤ ξn(Qγ),
(13)
E{ξn(Qγ)}+ λ D{ξn(Qγ)} ≥ ξn(Qγ)
is valid with probability w and λ is the root of
1√
2π
∫ λ
−∞
e−u
2/2 du =
1 + w
2
. (14)
Substituting here n = 1000, N = 58 and w = 0.95, we get E{ξn(Qγ)} =
950, D{ξn(Qγ)} ≈ 6.96, λ ≈ 1.96, and the following relationship is fulfilled
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with probability 95%: 936 < ξ1000(Q0.95) < 964. We can not estimate the
number of samples, in each of which the maximum exceeds the maximum of
the basic sample but we can count the number of maximal values exceed-
ing the known quantile Q0.95, that number is 949, a number witnessing the
correctness of the statistics.
In spite of the nice agreement we wish to underline that the (0.95|0.95)
safety policy does not exclude rare events such as limit violation when some
of the calculated values are over the limit UT .
Another conclusion is that the maximal element of a single sam-
ple of 58 elements would be y(b)(58) and if we repeat the sampling
several times, then in relatively large number of the samples we
get a higher than y(b)(58) value for the maximal element. In the
light of this experience one asks: is this the intended outcome of
the 0.95|0.95 methodology? It is clear that a larger safety margin
is needed to compensate for the weakness of the 0.95|0.95 method-
ology.
One must mention here that the result found in the above presented exam-
ple is not exceptional but it is a direct consequence of a well-known theorem
of mathematical statistics. It is easy to show that if one repeats the sampling
from any continuous distribution (n+1) times independently, then the prob-
ability that at least k out of n maximal sample elements y(1)(N), . . . , y(n)(N)
will exceed the initial (basic) sample value y(b)(N), is equal to 1− k/(n+1).
The proof of the theorem and two important remarks are given in the Ap-
pendix.
4 Method based on sign test
The concluding remarks at the end of the previous section are not optimistic.
The question is whether one can find a method more suitable for checking,
from a computer model, the safety of a large device? Below we propose such
a method based on sign test.
Again, we assume the cumulative distribution function G(y) of the output
variable to be continuous but unknown. Let SN = {y1, . . . , yN} be a sample
of N observations (runs of a computer model). Define the function
∆(x) =


1, if x > 0,
0, if x < 0,
(15)
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and introduce the statistical function
zN =
N∑
j=1
∆(UT − yj) (16)
which gives the number of sample elements smaller than UT . Criteria based
on statistical function (16) are called sign criterion since zN counts the
positive UT − yj differences. When G(y) is continuous, the probability of
UT − y = 0 is zero.
Obviously, distribution of zN is binomial, using the notation
P{∆(UT − y) = 1} = P{y ≤ UT} = p, (17)
we obtain
P{zN = j} =
(
N
j
)
pj (1− p)N−j, j = 0, 1, . . . , N. (18)
Our task is to find a confidence interval [γL(k), γU(k)] that covers the
value p with a prescribed probability β provided we have a sample of size N
and in that sample zN = k ≤ N . The probability (17) gives the probability
that the output y is not larger than the technological limit UT . When the
lower level γL(k) of the confidence interval is close to unity, we can claim at
least with probability β that the chance of finding the output y smaller than
UT is also close to unity and the system under consideration can be regarded
as safe at the level [β|γL(k)].
If the sample size N > 50, the random variable
k −Np√
Np (1− p) = ζk (19)
has approximately normal distribution. Here k is the number of sample
elements not exceeding UT . Let β denote the confidence level, then
P{|ζk| ≤ uβ} = 2Φ(uβ)− 1 = β,
where Φ(x) is the standard normal distribution function. This equation can
be rewritten in the form
P{|ζk| ≤ uβ} = P{(N + u2β)(p− γL)(p− γU) ≤ 0} = β,
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where
γL = γL(k, uβ) =
=
1
N + u2β
[
k +
1
2
u2β − uβ
√
k(1− k/N) + u2β/4
]
, (20)
and
γU = γU(k, uβ) =
=
1
N + u2β
[
k +
1
2
u2β + uβ
√
k(1− k/N) + u2β/4
]
. (21)
Here uβ is the root of
Φ(uβ) =
1
2
(1 + β).
In a number of cases it suffices to know the probability of the event
{γL(k, vβ) ≤ p}. Since ζk with k fixed is a decreasing function of p, the
events {ζk ≤ vβ} and {γL(k, vβ) ≤ p} are equivalent, hence
P{ζk ≤ vβ} = P{γL(k, vβ) ≤ p} = Φ(vβ) = β.
Consequently, the operation of a system can be regarded safe if the param-
eter p for all output variables is covered by [γL(k, vβ), 1] with a prescribed
probability β, provided that γL(k, vβ) is close to unity.
Table 3: Number of successes k in a sample of size N
k 99 108 118 128 137 147 157 166 176 185 195
N 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
Table 3 gives the number of successes k in a sample of size N needed for
acceptance at the level β = γL = 0.95. We utilized approximate formula (20)
to derive the entries in Tab. 3.
When the sample size is less than 50, we may not apply the asymptotically
valid normal distribution. The below given derivation of the confidence limits
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is a modified method proposed by Clopper and Pearson [8]. The probability
of at least k successes from N observations is given by
S
(N)
k (p) =
k∑
j=0
(
N
j
)
pj (1− p)N−j,
where p = P{y ≤ UT}. This formula can be recast as
S
(N)
k (p) =
N !
k! (N − k − 1)!
∫ 1−p
0
(1− v)k vN−k−1 dv,
and it is clear from that expression that S
(N)
k (p) is a monotonously decreasing
function of p. Since
S
(N)
k (p) =


1, if p = 0,
0, if p = 1,
it assumes an arbitrary value only once in the interval [0,1]. Consequently, a
p = pδ value exists so that
S
(N)
k (pδ) = δ, ∀ 0 < δ < 1.
Exploiting the monotony, we can construct a function such that
R
(N)
k (p) < R
(N)
k (pδ) = δ,
when p > pδ. Such a function is
R
(N)
k (p) = 1− S(N)k−1(p) =
N∑
j=k
(
N
j
)
pj (1− p)N−j ,
Finally, we establish the upper limit γU from
S
(N)
k (γU) ≤
1
2
(1− β),
and the lower limit γL from
R
(N)
k (γL) ≤
1
2
(1− β).
The interval [γL, γU ] covers the unknown parameter p with probability β.
The dependence of γL and γU are shown in Fig. 2 for a sample of N = 100
elements, cl stands for confidence level β.
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Figure 2: Dependence of γL and γU on the number of successes in a sample of N=100
elements.
4.1 Several output variables
Now we assume the output to comprise n variables. Let these variables be
y1, . . . , yn. There are several fairly good tests to prove if they are statisti-
cally independent. To independent variables we can apply the considerations
above but for dependent variables we need novel considerations. Let
SN =


y11 y12 . . . y1N
y21 y22 . . . y2N
...
...
. . .
...
yn1 yn2 . . . ynN


denote the sample matrix obtained in N >> 2n independent observations.
With a computer model, an observation is a run. Introducing the column
vector ~yk, the sample matrix is written as
SN = (~y1, . . . , ~yN) .
Below we expound the sign test for two output variables y1 and y2 relying
on the assumption that their joint distribution function G(y1,y2) is unknown
but continuous in either variable. The goal of the foregoing analysis is to
verify the safety conditions y1 < U
(1)
T and y2 < U
(2)
T . When the condition
is accomplished with probability p12 = G(U
(1)
T , U
(2)
T ) ≈ 1 we say the sys-
tem is safe. Here, as before, the limits U
(1)
T , and U
(2)
T are determined by
the technology. Since p12 is unknown, our job is to construct a confidence
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interval [γ
(1,2)
L , γ
(1,2)
U ] so that it covers p12 with probability β12. In most
cases it suffices to calculate solely γ
(1,2)
L and to use the interval [γ
(1,2)
L , 1]
as confidence interval. Now the column vectors introduced above have two
components. In accordance with our assumption, different vectors are statis-
tically independent but the components in a given vector are not necessarily
independent. In order to keep the notation as simple as possible, the event
{y1 < U (1)T , y2 < U (2)T } will be called a success. If y1k < U (1)T and y2k < U (2)T ,
then
∆(U
(1)
T − y1k) ∆(U (2)T − y2k) = 1,
while 0 otherwise, and introduce the statistical function
z
(1,2)
N =
N∑
k=1
∆(U
(1)
T − y1k) ∆(U (2)T − y2k)
which gives the number of successes in the sample of size N . Since the newly
introduced random variable is the sum of N independent random variables,
assuming values either 1 or 0, its distribution is binomial. Using the notation
P{∆(U (1)T − y1) ∆(U (2)T − y2) = 1} =
= P{y1 < U (1)T , y2 < U (2)T } = p12,
we can write
P{z(1,2)N = k} =
(
N
k
)
pk12 (1− p12)N−k,
for k = 0, 1, . . . , N . At this point we rejoin the thought of line of the previ-
ous subsection. Instead of repeating the already familiar argumentation, we
amend two trivial although important remarks. Let us define the following
two statistical functions:
z
(1)
N =
N∑
i=1
∆(U
(1)
T − y1i)
and
z
(2)
N =
N∑
j=1
∆(U
(2)
T − y2j).
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These two functions are not statistically independent, either one is the sum
of N independent random variables with values 1 or 0, therefore, one can
write
P{z(1)N = i} =
(
N
i
)
pi1(1− p1)N−i
and
P{z(2)N = j} =
(
N
j
)
pj2(1− p2)N−j,
i, j = 1, . . . , N,
where
pℓ = P{yℓ < U (ℓ)T } = P{∆(U (ℓ)T − yℓ) = 1},
ℓ = 1, 2,
are unknown probabilities. Applying the method used previously, this time
separately to the samples
S(1)N = {y1i, i = 1, . . . , N}
and
S(2)N = {y2j, j = 1, . . . , N}
we construct two random intervals [γ
(1)
L , 1] and [γ
(2)
L , 1] covering p1 and p2
with probabilities β1 and β2, respectively.
Obviously, it could occur that the levels (β1|γ(1)L ) and (β2|γ(2)L ) corrob-
orate the claim that samples S(1)N and S(2)N separately comply with safety
requirements. This does not mean that we would arrive at the same con-
clusion from analyzing the two sets jointly. The reason is that y1 and y2,
the two output random variables are not statistically independent. Hence,
we should ascertain weather the interval [γ
(1,2)
L , 1] covers the probability p12
with the pre-assigned probability β12. Since γ
(1,2)
L ≤ min{γ(1)L , γ(2)L }, γ(1)L and
γ
(2)
L would not contain information sufficient to declare the system safe. De-
cision on the safety, when two output variables are subjected to limitations
should go as follows. Firstly, we test the hypothesis concerning dependence
of the output variables y1 and y2. If they are dependent, we should esti-
mate the probability of the event {y1 < U (1)T , y2 < U (2)T }. Solely if they
are statistically independent should we estimate the probability of events
{y1 < U (1)T }, {y2 < U (2)T } independently.
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Finally, we mention that the generalization of the sign test to n > 2
output variables is straightforward, we have to use the statistical function
z
(1,...,n)
N =
N∑
k=1
n∏
j=1
∆(U
(j)
T − yjk) (22)
to evaluate safety based on observation of N samples of the n output vari-
ables. In this manner we obtain the sum of N independent random variables
in expression (22), and then, the further steps will be the same as at the
beginning of the subsection.
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Figure 4: Sample b)
An example is given below. We have generated two samples a) and b)
using Monte Carlo simulation, either sample contains N = 100 observations
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(or runs) of two output variables. The samples have been generated from a
bivariate normal distribution with parameters m1 = m2 = 0 and σ1 = σ2 = 1
but the correlation coefficient is C = 0.1, C = 0.7 in sample a) and b),
respectively. The acceptance range is [−2, 2] for both output variables. In
sample a) and b) four and one samples lie respectively outside the acceptance
range. The results of the simulation can be seen in Fig. 3 and in Fig. 4.
Table 4: Lower confidence limits in a sample of N = 100, k is the number of success.
k \ β 0.90 0.95 0.99
90 0.8501 0.8362 0.8086
91 0.8616 0.8482 0.8212
92 0.8733 0.8602 0.8340
93 0.8850 0.8725 0.8471
94 0.8970 0.8850 0.8604
95 0.9092 0.8977 0.8741
96 0.9216 0.9108 0.8882
97 0.9344 0.9242 0.9030
98 0.9476 0.9383 0.9185
99 0.9616 0.9534 0.9354
100 0.9772 0.9704 0.9549
First let us consider sample a). From Tab. 4 one can read that the
interval [0.9108,1] covers the parameter p12 with probability β12=0.95.
When we assess the output variables one by one, we see that the as-
sociated probabilities p1 and p2 are covered by the interval [0.9383, 1] with
probability β = 0.95 in either sample. However tempting is to use 0.9383 as
lower bound for the probability to be used in safety analysis, that number
has nothing to do with p12 and should not be used in safety analysis.
Now let us pass on to sample b) where we see a strong correlation between
y1 and y2. From Tab. 4 one can read that the confidence interval [0.9383, 1]
covers the probability β12 = 0.95. From that sample we conclude that the
probability of the event {y1 < U (1)T , y2 < U (2)T } is at least 0.9383. The single
variable parameters p1 and p2 determined from sample b) are covered by
the intervals [0.9534, 1] and [0.9383, 1], respectively on the level β1 = β2 =
0.95. Again, however favorable these numbers are, they should not be used
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in assessing safety. The above discussed simple numerical example clearly
indicated the danger awaiting the analyst when his/her judgment is based
on tests performed separately on correlated output variables.
5 Concluding remarks
The authors have investigated the statistical methods applied to safety analy-
sis of nuclear reactors and arrived at alarming conclusions: Guba and Trosztel
[7] carried out a series of calculations with the generally appreciated safety
code ATHLET to ascertain the stability of the results against input uncer-
tainties in a simple experimental situation. Scrutinizing those calculations,
we came to the conclusion [3] that the ATHLET results may exhibit irregular
behavior. A further conclusion is that the technological limits are incorrectly
set [5] when the output variables are correlated. Another formerly unnoticed
conclusion of the Guba-Trosztel calculations [7] is that certain innocent look-
ing parameters (like wall roughness factor, the number of bubbles per unit
volume, the number of droplets per unit volume) can influence considerably
such output parameters as water levels. The authors are concerned with the
statistical foundation of present day safety analysis practices and can only
hope that their own misjudgment will be dispelled.
Until then, the authors suggest applying correct statistical methods in
safety analysis even if it makes the analysis more expensive. It would be
desirable to continue exploring the role of internal parameters (wall rough-
ness factor, steam-water surface in thermal hydraulics codes, homogenization
methods in neutronics codes) in system safety codes and to study their effects
on the analysis.
In the validation and verification process of a code one carries out a
series of computations. The input data are not precisely determined because
measured data have an error, calculated data are often obtained from a more
or less accurate model. Some users of large codes are content with comparing
the nominal output obtained from the nominal input, whereas all the possible
inputs should be taken into account when judging safety. At the same time,
any statement concerning safety must be aleatory, and its merit can be judged
only when the probability is known with which the statement is true. In some
cases statistical aspects of safety are misused as in [5], where the number of
runs for several outputs is correct only for statistically independent outputs,
or misinterpreted as in [6].
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We do not know the probability distribution of the output variables sub-
jected to safety limitations. At the same time in some asymmetric distribu-
tions the 0.95|0.95 methodology simply fails: if we repeat the calculations in
many cases we would get a value higher than the basic value, which means
the limit violation in the calculation becomes more and more probable in the
repeated analysis.
Consequent application of order statistics or the application of the sign
test may offer a way out of the present situation. The authors are also
convinced that efforts should be made
• to study the statistics of the output variables,
• to study the occurrence of chaos in the analyzed cases.
All these observations should influence, in safety analysis, the applica-
tion of best estimate methods, and underline the opinion that any realistic
modelling and simulation of complex systems must include the probabilistic
features of the system and the environment.
Appendix
Let η be a random variable with continuous distribution defined over the real
numbers R, and let the distribution function of η be
P {η ≤ y} = G(y). (23)
We carry out N statistically independent observations of η. That operation
is called K. We repeat K n+1 times. We group the observed values into the
following (n+ 1)×N matrix:
η01 η02 · · · η0N
η11 η12 · · · η1N
. . . . . . . . . · · ·
ηn1 ηn2 · · · ηnN
. (24)
Let denote ζj = max1≤k≤N ηjk the maximum observed in operation j.
Lemma. Since the probability density function G(y) is monotonously
increasing, and continuous, the following equation holds for 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1:
P
{
max
1≤k≤N
ηjk > G
−1(γ)
}
= P
{∫ ζj
−∞
dG(y) > γ
}
= 1− γN , (25)
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where G−1(γ) = Qγ is the γ quantile of the probability density distribution
function G(y).
The presented Lemma is well known, we omit its proof. Now we turn
to the determination of the probability distribution of the largest sample
elements.
Theorem.The probability of the event that among the independent ran-
dom variables ζ1, . . . , ζN there is k ≤ N greater than ζ0 is
Pk = 1− k
n + 1
. (26)
Proof: Since ηjk, j = 0, 1, . . . , n; k = 1, . . . , N are independent and identically
distributed, we have
P {ζj ≤ z} = P
{
max
1≤k≤N
ηjk ≤ z
}
=
N∏
k=1
P {ηjk ≤ z} = H(z). (27)
In other words, H(z) is the probability of ζj not being larger than z ∈ R for
any j = 0, 1, . . . , n. Let 0 ≤ νn(z) ≤ n denote the number of those variables
from among ζ1, . . . , ζn which are greater than z. Obviously,
P {νn(z) = ℓ} = J (n)ℓ (z) =
(
n
ℓ
)
(1−H(z))ℓ (H(z))(n−ℓ) . (28)
Let Pk stand for the probability that from among the random variables
ζ1, . . . , ζn at least k ≤ n is greater than ζ0, which may take any number
from R. We get
Pk =
n∑
ℓ=k
pℓ =
n∑
ℓ=k
∫ +∞
−∞
J
(n)
ℓ (z)dH(z). (29)
The determination of probabilities pℓ is straightforward:
pℓ =
∫ +∞
−∞
J
(n)
ℓ (z)dH(z) =
(
n
ℓ
) ∫ +∞
−∞
(1−H(z))ℓ (H(z))n−ℓ dH(z). (30)
The integrals are evaluated without difficulties:
pℓ =
(
n
ℓ
) ∫ 1
0
(1− u)ℓun−ℓdu = 1
n+ 1
. (31)
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As we see, pℓ is independent of ℓ and using Eq. (29), we get
Pk =
n∑
ℓ=k
1
n+ 1
=
n− k + 1
n+ 1
= 1− k
n+ 1
. (32)
Q.E.D.
We add two remarks.
1. Remark 1. Whichever we choose from among the random variables
ζ0, ζ1, . . . , ζn, with probability
1
n+1
we find among the others ℓ exceed-
ing the first chosen one. (Since ζ0, ζ1, . . . , ζn are continuous random
variables, the probability of two values to be identical is zero.)
2. Remark 2. Let λ be the number of those ζj1, ζj2, . . . , ζjn variables
which are greater than a given ζj0. Clearly, λ is a random variable, its
expectation value is
E {λ} =
n∑
ℓ=0
ℓpℓ =
n
2
, (33)
the variance being
D2 {λ} =
n∑
ℓ=0
(ℓ− n/2)2 pℓ = 1
6
n
(
1 +
1
2
n
)
. (34)
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